We consider an international cartel whose members interact repeatedly in their own as well as in third-country segmented markets. Cartel discipline-an inverse measure of the degree of competition between firms-is endogenously determined by the cartel’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICC),...

Welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is compared to free-trade welfare under perfect competition in the case of a large country able to affect its terms of trade; under Cournot duopoly with differentiated products; and under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products. Under perfect...

This paper adds to the literature on transboundary pollution by considering pollution related to both production and consumption activities. In particular, we consider a symmetric strategic two firm-two country game model with bilateral trade and transboundary pollution to analyze the effects of...

This paper sets up a general oligopolistic equilibrium model with unionized labor markets. By accounting for productivity differences, the model features profit and wage differentials across industries. We use this setting to study the impact of trade liberalization on employment, welfare, and...

This paper sets up a general oligopolistic equilibrium model with unionized labor markets. By accounting for productivity differences, the model features profit and wage differentials across industries. We use this setting to study the impact of trade liberalization on employment, welfare, and...

In a framework of a unionised international Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products, this paper analyses national labour market interdependencies and the consequences of trade liberalisation for union wages. The analysis suggests that national wages are likely to be strategic complements...