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Riacquisto di debito pubblico : estero e interno

Marchesi, Silvia - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001711223

Adoption of an IMF programme and debt rescheduling : an empirical analysis

Marchesi, Silvia - In: Journal of development economics 70 (2003) 2, pp. 403-423

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001758310

Riacquisto di debito pubblico : estero e interno

Marchesi, Silvia - In: Rivista di politica economica 92 (2002) 7/8, pp. 131-165

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001894621

Adoption of an IMF programme and debt rescheduling : an empirical analysis

Marchesi, Silvia - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001488216

Adoption of an IMF programme and debt rescheduling : an empirical analysis

Marchesi, Silvia - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001582656

Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence

Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura; Dreher, Axel - 2009

We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264578

Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence

Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura; Dreher, Axel - 2009

We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269064

Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: Theory and empirical evidence

Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura; Dreher, Axel - 2009

We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281823

What motivates lending and aid to the HIPCs?

Marchesi, Silvia; Missale, Alessandro - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003347753

Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending : theory and empirical evidence

Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura; Dreher, Axel - 2009

We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003876384

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