This text presents ten Quebec examples on green profitability. Managers concerned with the quality of the environment may find new ideas and arguments to convince their colleagues in being proactive in this matter. However, before presenting these examples, we must put the issue in a more...

We analyze 17 studies of the use of sustainable development indicators (SDI) in an urban setting. The analysis reveals a lack of consensus not only on the conceptual framework and the approach favored, but also on the selection and optimal number of indicators. First, by performing different...

The present paper deals with some legal issues surrounding environmental protection, namely those issues concerning the liability of the different firms and individuals directly or indirectly involved in the generation of environment damaging accidents. We consider in particular the potential...

This paper explores the effects of effluent regulatory activity on firm behavior in the pulp and paper industry in Ontario. The model uses instrumental variables to attempt to distinguish between that correlation between emission limits and emissions coming from regulatory capture and that...

Using a formal political economy model with incomplete information regarding the accident preventing activities chosen by the firm (moral hazard) under limited liability, we illustrate different conditions under which an environmental protection system based on extending liability to private...

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives: (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders...

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete...

Economists have greatly criticized regulations that impose uniform environmental standards on plants which may differ in terms both of their marginal abatement cost and marginal damage functions. Such a critic ignores however that the implementation of the standards may vary significantly across...

It has been observed that upon trading-off the costs and benefits of pollution control, profit-maximizing firms may choose not to invest their resources in pollution abatement since the expected penalty imposed by regulators falls considerably short of the investment costs. Regulators have...

We investigate economic depreciation of natural capital for cases of non-stationary output prices, technology and interest rates. For the former two cases (exogenous movements in prices and technology), constant consumption emerges under a strategy of investing to cover off economic...