This paper explores the relationship between environmental protection and international capital movements, when tax policy is endogenous (through voting). A two-period general equilibrium model of a small open economy is specified to compare the effects of two different constitutions (commitment...

This paper explores the relationship between environmental protection and international capital movements, when tax policy is endogenous (through voting). A two-period general equilibrium model of a small open economy is specified to compare the effects of two different constitutions (commitment...

This paper analyzes consequences of lobby group activity for policy outcomes in economies with transboundary pollution and international environmental policies. International environmental policies are here characterized as pollution taxes determined in a negotiation between two countries. The...

This paper analyzes environmental policy in a decentralized economic federation comprising two countries, where a federal government decides upon environmental targets (maximum allowable emissions) for each country, which are implemented by the national governments. Both national governments...

We derive conditions on individual preferences and technology that give rise to a negative correlation between income inequality and environmental protection. We present a class of models (which captures a static model as well as an overlapping-generations model) in which individuals differ in...

We analyze how, in representative democracies, income distribution influences the stringency of environmental policy and economic growth. Individuals (who differ in abilities) live for two periods, working when young and owning capital when old. Externalities are caused by a polluting factor....

This paper explores the relationship between environmental protection and international capital movements, when tax policy is endogenous (through voting). A two-period general equilibrium model of a small open economy is specified to compare the effects of two different constitutions (commitment...

This paper explores how the costs of meeting given aggregate targets for pollution emissions change with the imposition of the requirement that key pollution-related industries be compensated for potential losses of profit from the pollution regulation. Using analytically and numerically solved...

This paper examines the choice between revenue-raising and non-revenue-raising instruments for environmental protection in a second-best setting with pre-existing factor taxes. We find that interactions with pre-existing taxes fundamentally influence the costs of regulation and seriously...