incentives through groupversus individual bonus schemes. When workers have a propensity for envy, eitherscheme may be the least …

We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance … envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when these costs are high, less …

We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance … envy depending on the costs of assessing performance. More envious employees are preferred when these costs are high, less …

A worker's utility may increase in his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income … various assumptions about the object and generality of envy. Envy amplifies the effect of incentives on effort and, therefore …, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make profitsharing optimal, even when the worker's effort is fully …

Trittbrettfahrerproblems und die Anreizwirkung von Neid. Im dritten Aufsatz wird relationalen Individualbonusverträgen ein relatives … wird für ein Beispiel gezeigt, dass die Zinsspanne, für die der Bonusvertrag das Turnier dominiert, im Neid der Agenten … to the literature, we find that inequity aversion may be beneficial: In the presence of envy, for a certain range of …

A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This … article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the … applications of our theoretical work: envy can explain why a lower-level worker is awarded stock options, why incentive pay is …

A worker's utility may increase with his own income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income … various assumptions about the object and generality of envy. Envy amplifies the effect of incentives on effort and, therefore …, increases optimal incentive pay. Moreover, envy can make profit-sharing optimal, even when the worker's effort is fully …