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Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching : equilibria versus stability

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011486876

Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011486886

Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching : equilibria versus stability

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011628386

Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590455

Non-revelation mechanisms for manyto-many matching : equilibria versus stability

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590504

Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching : equilibria versus stability

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - In: Games and economic behavior 104 (2017), pp. 222-229

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011793353

Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - In: Economics letters 144 (2016), pp. 98-101

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011617215

On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game : limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - In: Journal of economic theory 154 (2014), pp. 187-215

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010481365

A selfish allocation heuristic in scheduling : equilibrium and inefficiency bound analysis

Braat, Jac; Hamers, Herbert; Klijn, Flip; Slikker, Marco - In: European journal of operational research : EJOR 273 (2019) 2, pp. 634-645

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011987571

Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts

Haake, Claus-Jochen (contributor); … - 2005

We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731666