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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010389538
Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806463
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Harris, Reny, and Robson (Econometrica, 1995) add a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when nature's moves are atomless in the original game, SPE obtained via this channel can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012945084
We show that dynamic bargaining games are characterized by a continuum of stationary Markov perfect equilibria, when the set of alternatives is multidimensional and players are patient. In fact, we show that there is a continuum of equilibria close to any alternative satisfying a simple linear...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010504626
This paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the alternative chosen in one period determines the status quo for the next. We generalize a sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium due to Anesi and Seidmann, 2015. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856695
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