In a financial market where agents trade for short-term profit and where news can increase the uncertainty of the public belief, there are strategic complementarities in the acquisition of private information and, if the cost of information is sufficiently small, a continuum of equilibrium...

How does information get revealed in decentralized markets? We test several hypotheses inspired by recent dealer-network theory. To do so we construct an empirical map of information revelation where two dealers are connected based on the synchronicity of their quote changes. The tests, based on...

Sponsored search advertising is ascendant -- Jupiter Research reports expenditures rose 28% in 2007 to $8.9B and will continue to rise at a 26% CAGR, approaching 1/2 the level of television advertising and making it one of the major advertising trends to affect the marketing landscape. Yet...

An information structure in a non-cooperative game determines the signal that each player observes as a function of the strategy profile. Such information structure is called non-manipulable if no player can gain new information by changing his strategy. A Conjectural Equilibrium (CE)...

This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets, e.g. the informativeness of transcripts given out by universities. We show that the same amount of information is disclosed in all equilibria. We then demonstrate that if universities disclose the equilibrium amount of information,...

We study credence goods in a general model. A consumer may suffer a loss which is a continuous random variable. Privately observing the loss value, an expert can provide a repair at a price to eliminate the consumer's loss. All perfect-Bayesian equilibria are inefficient, in that some losses are...