I consider the optimal contract for an overconfident manager in a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the contract is written on the earnings of the firm. Overconfidence causes the manager to overestimate his ability to affect the outcome of the firm. Overconfidence first reduces cost...

Overstaffng appears to be a source of signi cant ineffciencies in organizations, but there is little economic theory that informs us why. We extend the canonical Lazear-Rosen tournament model to a dynamic setting that yields overstaffng at the managerial level. Overstaffng can be optimal in...

With the rise of strategic outsourcing, the distribution of skills and competences between partners grows increasingly uneven. This misalignment reflects the complex distribution of responsibilities under outsourcing arrangements. Because each firm in an outsourcing arrangement may have to...

This paper addresses the key determinants of merger failure, in particular the role of innovation (post-merger performance) and technology (ex-ante selection) when firms decide to separate. After a brief review of the existing literature we introduce a model of process innovation where merged...

This paper addresses the key determinants of merger failure, in particular the role of innovation (post-merger performance) and technology (ex-ante selection) when firms decide to separate. After a brief review of the existing literature we introduce a model of process innovation where merged...