In an earlier paper [Rational choice andAGMbelief revision, Artificial Intelligence, 2009] a correspondence was established between the choice structures of revealed-preference theory (developed in economics) and the syntactic belief revision functions of the AGM theory (developed in philosophy...

We consider a basic logic with two primitive uni-modal operators: one for certainty and the other for plausibility. The former is assumed to be a normal operator (corresponding - semantically - to a binary Kripke relation), while the latter is merely a classical operator (corresponding -...

We provide a new characterization of both belief update and belief revision in terms of a Kripke-Lewis semantics. We consider frames consisting of a set of states, a Kripke belief relation and a Lewis selection function. Adding a valuation to a frame yields a model. Given a model and a state, we...

We provide a new characterization of AGM belief revision in terms of a Kripke-Stalnaker-Lewis semantics. We consider pointed frames consisting of a set of states, a distinguished state interpreted as the actual state, a Kripke belief relation and a Stalnaker-Lewis selection function. Adding a...

In an earlier paper [Rational choice and AGM belief revision, Artificial Intelligence, 2009] a correspondence was established between the choice structures of revealed-preference theory (developed in economics) and the syntactic belief revision functions of the AGM theory (developed in...

We consider interactive epistemic models where individuals are described by both their "knowledge" and their "beliefs." Three intersubjective consistency conditions are examined: Intersubjective Caution (if an individual believes something to be common belief then he knows it to be common...