Common ratio effects should be ruled out if subjects' preferences satisfy compound independence, reduction of compound lotteries, and coalescing. In other words, at least one of these axioms should be violated in order to generate a common ratio effect. Relying on a simple experiment, we...

We present the first calibration of quantum decision theory (QDT) to an empirical data set. The data comprise 91 choices between two lotteries (two "prospects") presented in 91 random pairs made by 142 subjects offered at two separated times. First, we quantitatively account for the fraction of...

Probabilistic preference models predict that a subject makes different choices with different probabilities in repeatedly experiments with the same stimuli. This paper explains why. First, we prove that a gamble is a statistical ensemble or sample function of a random field with canonical...

We propose a new parametrization of Quantum Decision Theory (QDT), based on Rank Dependent Utility Theory (RDU). Using experimental data made of choices between pairs of lotteries, we compare QDT with "classical" decision theories, RDU and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). At the aggregate...

In confidence theory, the decision maker relies on statistical regularities from the economic environment to adopt prior beliefs about the probabilities stated on a lottery. Following the confidence principle, by which the weight of the prior in Bayesian inference is proportional to the...

We investigate what it means for one act to be more ambiguous than another. The question is evidently analogous to asking what makes one prospect riskier than another, but beliefs are neither objective nor representable by a unique probability. Our starting point is an abstract class of...

Economists often estimate a subset of their model parameters outside the model and let the decision-makers inside the model treat these point estimates as-if they are correct. This practice ignores model ambiguity, opens the door for misspecification of the decision problem, and leads to...

Humans are notoriously bad at understanding probabilities, exhibiting a host of biases and distortions that are context dependent. This has serious consequences on how we assess risks and make decisions. Several theories have been developed to replace the normative rational expectation theory at...

The decision-theoretic literature has developed very few techniques to bound the expected utility of a random variable when only simple statistics like its median or mode or mean are known. One reason for this lack of results is that we are missing a convenient way to link probability theory and...

Most decisions in life are gambles. Should I speed up or slow down as I approach the yellow traffic light ahead? Should I invest in the stock market or in treasury bills? Should I undergo surgery or radiation therapy to treat my tumor? From mundane choices rendered with scarcely a moment's...