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Sick leave payments represent a significant portion of public health expenditures and labor costs. Reductions in replacement levels are a commonly used instrument to tackle moral hazard and to increase the efficiency of the health insurance market. In Germany's Statutory Health Insurance (SHI)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003832840
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003835277
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Sick leave payments represent a significant portion of public health expenditures and labor costs. Reductions in replacement levels are a commonly used instrument to tackle moral hazard and to increase the efficiency of the health insurance market. In Germany's Statutory Health Insurance (SHI)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011634717
Am 1. Januar 1997 trat eine Krankengeldkürzung von 80 auf 70 Prozent des Bruttoeinkommens in Kraft. Ab der siebten Woche erhalten gesetzlich Versicherte Krankengeld, sie gelten als langzeitkrank. Berechnungen auf Basis des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels (SOEP) zeigen, dass durch diese Maßnahme...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011601997
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011601998
Sick leave payments represent a significant portion of public health expenditures and labor costs. Reductions in replacement levels are a commonly used instrument to tackle moral hazard and to increase the efficiency of the health insurance market. In Germany's Statutory Health Insurance (SHI)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271106
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003835283
This paper proposes a test for the existence and degree of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. First, we theoretically decompose moral hazard into shirking and contagious presenteeism behavior and derive testable conditions. Then, we implement the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011339778
This paper proposes a test for the existence and degree of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. First, we theoretically decompose moral hazard into shirking and contagious presenteeism behavior and derive testable conditions. Then, we implement the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011340177