important primitives of social capital - trust and reciprocity - which can be used to explain deviations from the Nash … the behaviour of players in experimental trust and dictator games and suggest that the most informative utilization of … questionnaire about attitudes to trusting and reciprocating predict subjects' behaviour and, by comparing behaviour in Trust and …

that reason we also expect more altruism and trust of soldiers compared to pure civilian groups. To explore these issues in … an experimental setting, the subjects had to play the dictator game, the ultimatum game, and the trust game. These three …

that reason we also expect more altruism and trust of soldiers compared to pure civilian groups. To explore these issues in … an experimental setting, the subjects had to play the dictator game, the ultimatum game, and the trust game. These three …

The intention to “invest” in the Trust Game in extensive form revealed by a move could conceal different motivations … embedded in the trust game: 1) an “investment” motive - conditional cooperation is a way to express the expectation of … measures of trust and trustworthiness. In this paper, we will then be using the “words” of answers to a questionnaire in order …

designs may unintentionally affect reciprocity. We manipulate the investor’s action space in two versions of the “trust game … investment but limit investors’ demonstrability of intended trust. As a result, “all-in” investors are less generously …

We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits observation of …

For the trust game, recent models of belief-dependent motivations make opposite predictions regarding the correlation …

other hand, efficiency concerns and an aversion against violating trust seem to be far less important motivations. We also …