Similar Search Results

When is foreign aid policy credible? : Aid dependence and conditionality

Svensson, Jakob - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000959283

When is foreign aid policy credible? : Aid dependence and conditionality

Svensson, Jakob - In: Journal of development economics 61 (2000) 1, pp. 61-84

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001449189

Moral hazard, competition and contract design : empirical evidence from managerial, franchised and entrepreneurial businesses in Norway

Nygaard, Arne; Myrtveit, Ingunn - In: Applied economics 32 (2000) 3, pp. 349-356

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001489132

When is Foreign Aid Policy Credible? Aid Dependence and Conditionality

Svensson, Jakob - 2000

Disbursements of foreign aid are guided (in part) by the needs of the poor. Anticipating this, recipients have little incentive to improve the welfare of the poor. In principle, conditionality could partly solve the problem, but this requires a strong commitment ability by the donor. Without...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014149532

When is foreign aid policy credible? : aid dependence and conditionality

Svensson, Jakob - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013359970

An integrated power and efficiency model of contractual channel governance : theory and empirical evidence

Carson, Stephen J.; Ghosh, Mrinal K. - In: Journal of marketing 83 (2019) 4, pp. 101-120

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012176074

Estimation of an Efficient Tomato Contract

Ligon, Ethan A. - 2011

‐powered incentives produce higher levels of soluble solids, at a cost that is 1.8 per cent greater than otherwise. Efficiency losses from … information constraints are 1 per cent of mean compensation, whereas existing quality measurement improves efficiency by 1.08 per …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014185305