This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Some countries especially in continental Europe exhibit a corporatist politicoeconomic equilibrium with a sustantial protection of insiders on...

Problemstellung -- Die Leitfragen zur Evaluation des Aufsichtsrats -- Theoretisches und empirisches Wissen zur Effektivität und Effizienz des Aufsichtsrats: Eine Bestandsaufnahme -- Das Konzept zur Evaluation des Aufsichtsrats -- Die empirische Untersuchung -- Evaluation des Aufsichtsrats: Ein...

This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Two politicoeconomic equilibria arise from our model, one with little protection of insiders on capital and labor markets, and another one with...