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Stock Price Reaction to Supervisory Board Interventions : Empirical Evidence from Germany

Vetter, Karin - 2015

Within the discussion about an efficient corporate governance system, considerable attention has been paid to the supervisory board's responsibility to monitor top executives raising the question about the value relevance of supervisory board's actions (i.e., control). We conduct an event study...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038344

Managerial Entrenchment and Shareholder Wealth Revisited : Theory and Evidence from a Recessionary Financial Market

Kesten, Jay - 2012

climate, such as firm profitability, takeover frequency, and valuation of takeover premiums. The mainstream view, both of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116368

The impact of a takeover bid on the capital market efficiency

Knezovic, Anita; Culjak, Maria - In: UTMS journal of economics / University of Tourism and … 9 (2018) 2, pp. 109-120

The impact of the announcement of a takeover bid has been widely tested in foreign literature. Therefore, the main goal … of this paper is to research the impact of the announcement of a takeover bid on the share price movements in the … takeover bid affects the share prices of the target company, which is consistent with the results of previous research …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012178422

The Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions on Executive Pay in the United Kingdom

Guest, Paul M. - 2012

We examine the impact of acquisitions by UK acquirers on executive pay. The overall sample shows a significant transitory pay increase. Pay changes are not affected by target nationality or organizational form, although initial cross-border acquisitions result in higher pay. Pay increases are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013103147

The positive economics of corporatism and corporate governance

Fehn, Rainer; Meier, Carsten-Patrick - 2000

This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Two politicoeconomic equilibria arise from our model, one with little protection of insiders on capital and labor markets, and another one with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011477241

Managerial Entrenchment and Value-Relevance of Earnings During the Pre- and Post- Sarbanes Oxley Periods

Ng, Anthony C.; Gul, Ferdinand A.; Mensah, Yaw M. - 2008

This study examines the effect of the passing of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 as well as managerial entrenchment characteristics of corporations on the value-relevance of earnings. Our sample of observations is partitioned into three sub-periods: the Pre-Scandal (Pre-SCA) period, the Enron...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224307

The positive economics of corporatism and corporate governance

Fehn, Rainer - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013261086

Owners, Boards, Managers and the Private Benefits of Control : A Study of Dual Class Stock Firms in an Emerging Market

Muravyev, Alexander - 2011

This paper investigates whether and how various characteristics of CEOs and corporate boards are related to the severity of corporate governance problems within firms. The latter is proxied by private benefits of control, which we measure for dual class stock firms using the voting premium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121352

Time-Variation of Dual-Class Premia

Broussard, John Paul - 2019

Dual class shares have been in existence in financial markets for more than one hundred years. One class of shares provides superior voting power, while the other class provides preferential access to economic benefits. Extant literature suggests that superior voting class shares should trade at...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891689

The Value of Corporate Voting Rights: Valuation of Loyalty Voting Rights and Empirical Evidence from France and Italy

Gambert, Michael - In: Global tensions in financial markets, (pp. 75-88). 2018

This chapter is a case study of the valuation of voting rights in France and Italy. New regulations, France’s “Florange Law” as well as Italian Legislative Decree 91/2014, have created additional voting rights attached to the existing shares of long-term shareholders. The chapter tests...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015093890