Exchange rate and other macroeconomic fluctuations can be considered sources of good or bad “luck” for corporate performance. Incentive effects of performance-based compensation for management may be weakened or biased by macroeconomic influences on remuneration depending on the ability of...

We show in a theoretical model that credit default swaps induce managerial agency problems through two channels: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the intensity of monitoring by creditors, which leads to...

We investigate the impact of workers' exposure to unemployment risk on CEO incentive compensation. Exploiting state-level changes in unemployment benefits as a source of variation in workers' unemployment costs, we find that after unemployment insurance benefits become more generous boards...

Measuring the value of labor-market hires for stock prices, be it underwriters when firms go public (IPOs) or chief executive officers (CEOs), is difficult due to selection. Opaque firms with higher costs of capital benefit more from prestigious underwriters, while productive firms benefit more...

We show in a theoretical model that credit default swaps induce managerial agency problems through two channels: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the intensity of monitoring by creditors, which leads to...

Measuring the value of labor-market hires for stock prices, be it underwriters when firms go public (IPOs) or chief executive officers (CEOs), is difficult due to selection. Opaque firms with higher costs of capital benefit more from prestigious underwriters, while productive firms benefit more...