The fixed rate tender is one of the main operational formats used by central banks in the implementation of their monetary policies. While academic research has largely dismissed the procedure for its tendency to encourage overbidding, central banks such as the ECB and the Bank of England have...

This paper empirically evaluates two possible sources of large takeover premiums: preemptive bidding and target resistance. We develop an auction model that features costly sequential entry of bidders in takeover contests and that encompasses both explanations. We estimate the model parameters...

We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on...

In second price internet auctions with a fixed end time, such as those on eBay, many bidders snipe , i.e., they submit their bids in the closing minutes or seconds of an auction. Late bids of this sort are much less frequent in auctions that are automatically extended if a bid is submitted very...

We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on...

This paper empirically tests auction theory by examining how the stock market evaluates the outcome of open-bid English auctions of rights to develop residential real estate projects in Hong Kong. To do so, we deconstruct the complexity surrounding actual auction events, and empirically isolate...

We propose a non-sequential search model with a continuum of consumers and a finite number of firms. Both consumers and firms are heterogeneous. Consumers differ in search costs. Firms have private marginal costs of production. We show that an equilibrium price dispersion can arise in this model...

In this paper we propose a two-step semiparametric procedure to estimate first-price auction models. In the first-step, we estimate the bid density and distribution using local polynomial method, and recover a sample of (pseudo) private values. In the second-step, we apply the method of moments...

We extend Wilson (1979) share auction framework to model the uniform-price US Treasury auction as a two-stage multiple leader-follower game. We then explicitly derive the primary dealer's (follower) strategic choice of bids as a function of its customer's (leader) bids and show that an increase...

This online appendix contains the plots and supplemental descriptions for "Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions Credible? Semi- & Nonparametric Analyses."The paper "Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions Credible? Semi- & Nonparametric Analyses" to which this Supplement...