Showing 1 - 10 of 12,933
two important yet less extensively examined aspects of corporate governance in banks: executive team expertise and non … corporate governance matter. Higher executive team expertise is associated with superior bank outcomes regarding performance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011742813
We show in a theoretical model that credit default swaps induce managerial agency problems through two channels: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the intensity of monitoring by creditors, which leads to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932017
Morse, Nanda and Seru (2011) interpret the data to suggest that more powerful CEOs ex-post change their incentive contracts more. My paper points out a number of issues with their inference. First and most importantly, MNS do not control for the fact that not just the most powerful but almost...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065835
We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownershipaffects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes varia-tion in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intra-industryand intra-firm cross-market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011747733
We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes variation in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intra-industry and intra-firm cross-market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013477278
The questions of whether there ever existed excessive risk-taking incentives from executive compensation in the financial industry, and whether top executives of financial services firms actually responded to such excessive incentives that eventually led to the crisis remain unanswered. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012910594
I present and estimate a dynamic model of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and effort provision. I find that variation in CEO attributes explains the majority of variation in compensation (equity and total) but little of the variation in firm value. The primary drivers of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935607
When there is uncertainty about a CEO's quality, news about the firm causes rational investors to update their expectation of the firm's value for two reasons: Updates occur because of the direct effect of the news, and also because news leads investors to update their assessment of the CEO's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009724571
(SOPs) and Team Incentive Plans (TIPs). In do doing, we assemble important new panel data by merging data from a survey of … complements in their productivity effects. -- profit sharing ; employee stock ownership ; team incentive ; stock option …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008796746
importance of individual, team, and company performance for compensation, we find a significant positive relation between the … intensity of team incentives and several survey measures of cooperation. Moreover, higher powered team incentives are associated …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009235552