We show theoretically and empirically that executives are paid less for their own firm's performance and more for their rivals' performance if an industry's firms are more commonly owned by the same set of investors. Higher common ownership also leads to higher unconditional total pay. We...

When one firm's strategy affects other firms' value, optimal executive incentives depend on whether shareholders have interests in only one or in multiple firms. Performance-sensitive contracts induce managerial effort to reduce costs, and lower costs induce higher output. Hence, greater...

This paper analyzes the impact of blockownership dispersion on firm value. Blockholdings by multiple blockholders is a widespread phenomenon in the U.S. market. It is not clear, however, whether dispersion among blockholder is preferable to having a more concentrated ownership structure. To test...

Prior research shows that firms tend to recruit directors from the geographically-proximate area. Due to a limited supply of qualified individuals in a given area, firms located in close proximity have to share a limited pool of talented individuals. As a result, the larger the number of firms...

We investigate whether managerial ownership enhances firm value by exploiting exogenous variation resulting from stock price reactions to blockholder deaths. We find, first, that the average stock price reaction to the sudden death of inside blockholders ranges from -5% for small ownership...

By discriminating between a lazy manager and a career concerns hypothesis, Aghion et al. (The American Economic Review 2013, 103(1), 277-304) try to disentangle the link between innovation and institutional ownership. Citation-weighted patent counts are used as a proxy for innovation, which...

The paper explores how institutional ownership and ownership heterogeneity affect the firm's CVC launch, duration, portfolio decisions, and outcomes. Our finding shows an inverse U-shape relationship between institutional ownership and CVC investments. The increase in institutional ownership can...

Multiple blockholder structures are a widespread phenomenon in the U.S. The theoretical literature, however, provides conflicting predictions on whether a single large blockholder or a set of dispersed smaller blockholders is better for firm value. Using U.S. data, we find a negative...

We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownershipaffects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes varia-tion in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intra-industryand intra-firm cross-market...