The paper examines the relationship between managerial share ownership and firm performance for British stock-exchange listed firms. We seek to establish a link between the predictions of agency theory and the corporate control environment using key governance and disclosure thresholds as...

This paper analyses the performance consequences of board structure changes in Ghana for the study period 2000 to 2009. We predict that board structure changes prompted by the introduction of the Ghanaian Code in 2003 should lead to better firm performance. The results show that duality...

We study the effect of corporate board structure on firm performance under different product market conditions. Using customer-supplier links to identify exogenous downstream demand shocks, we find that board independence has a more significant effect on firm performance when the firm-specific...

Motivated by agency theory, we investigate the effect of board size on corporate outcomes. To address endogeneity, we exploit the variations in the director-age populations across the states in the U.S. We argue that firms with access to a larger pool of potential directors tend to have larger...

Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) estimate that CEO pay decreases by 17% more in firms whose boards were not compliant with the recent NYSE/NASDAQ independence requirements than in firms that were compliant. We document that 65% of the magnitude is driven by a single outlier. All our attempts to...

Chhaochharia and Grinstein (JF, 2009) estimate that CEO pay decreases by 17% more in firms that were not compliant with the recent NYSE/NASDAQ board independence requirement than in firms that were compliant. We document that 74% of this magnitude is attributable to two outliers out of 865...

Using Chhaochharia's and Grinstein's (JF, 2009) data and methodology, Guthrie, Sokolowsky, and Wan (JF, 2010) document that compensation committee independence leads to an increase in executive pay, and that the increase is concentrated in firms with powerful monitors. These findings stand in...

Outside directors and audit committees are widely considered to be central elements of good corporate governance. We use a 1999 Korean law as an exogenous shock to assess how board structure affects firm market value. The law mandates 50% outside directors and an audit committee for large public...

Prior research shows that firms tend to recruit directors from the geographically-proximate area. Due to a limited supply of qualified individuals in a given area, firms located in close proximity have to share a limited pool of talented individuals. As a result, the larger the number of firms...

We derive and develop a simple and intuitive model that shines fresh light on the relentless debate over whether corporate ownership converges to the Berle-Means modern corporation with high stock ownership dispersion. Our model takes into account the importance of both protective legal...