Abstract: Verstöße gegen Vorschriften des Wettbewerbsrechts gehen regelmäßig mit einer Schädigung vor- oder nachgelagerter Wirtschaftsstufen einher. Die Urteile ‚Courage’ und ‚Manfredi’, intensive Bemühungen der EU-Kommission, die Rahmenbedingungen für die private Durchsetzung...

In economic theory there is invariably a credible defence for all corporate competition practices. For the most part, the effects on static and dynamic competition functions cannot be uniquely identified. This places economic policymakers before the scope of discretion and responsible decision...

Leniency programs as a tool for cartel detection and cartel destabilization, have been implemented since the early nineties. Theoretical work has shown that leniency programs can be eff ective in enhancing cartel detection and deterrence, but these e ffects are not straight-forward. It is even...

Based on an analysis of cartel prosecutions since 2007, this article assesses the way the European Commission has built up its fines in practice. The fines are compared with those imposed by the European Commission over the period from 1999 to 2006. The main findings are that, while fines have...

This paper examines the effects of European Commission's (EC) new leniency program on the EC's capabilities in detecting and deterring cartels. As a supplementary analysis, the US leniency is studied. I discuss a dynamic model of cartel formation and dissolution to illustrate how changes in...