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The paper analyzes the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the European Parliament and the Council. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate the policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal decision...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264227
The paper analyzes the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the EU's Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010285063
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003612680
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003946727
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003292865
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003254651
The paper analyzes the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the European Parliament and the Council. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate the policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal decision...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012775808
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003752332