Europe's monetary union is part of a broader process of integration that started in the aftermath of World War II. In this "political guide for economists" we look at the creation of the euro within the bigger picture of European integration. How and why were European institutions established?...

Europe's monetary union is part of a broader process of integration that started in the aftermath of World War II. In this “political guide for economists” we look at the creation of the euro within the bigger picture of European integration. How and why were European institutions...

This article reveals a neglected aspect of macroeconomic indicators – their integrative power as vehicles to deepen European integration. It focusses on the euro area fiscal stance which provides guidance on the overall direction of fiscal policy in the euro area. Debtor countries, the ECB and...

There is evidence for a strong demand for safety, both steady and inelastic. A sudden loss of safe assets played a key role in the financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis. I show that a common fiscal policy can benefit all member states of a monetary union by offering a more...

This contribution develops a theory on the impact of differentiation on integration and unity among EU member states and discusses empirical evidence from four policy areas. According to the theory, the centripetal effects of closer cooperation among willing EU members on initially unwilling...

While international human rights law promulgates that economic, social and cultural rights (economic rights) be supported just as fervently as civil and political rights, the reality is, they are not. The Greek debt crisis and resulting austerity measures demonstrate how a growing world economy...

A government applying for a club membership may strategically delay entry to cope with the hold-up problem introduced by anticipatory investments of the private sector. In equilibrium of a two-period incomplete information game, we find that a pro-entry government may strategically delay to...

This paper presents a model of nations where agents vote on the optimal level of public pending. Larger nations benefit from increasing returns in the provision of public goods, but bear the costs of greater cultural heterogeneity. This tradeoff induces agents' preferences over different...