Similar Search Results

An Evolutionary Game Theory Explanation of ARCH Effects

Parke, William R - 2017

While ARCH/GARCH equations have been widely used to model financial market data, formal explanations for the sources of … conditional volatility are scarce. This paper presents a model with the property that standard econometric tests detect ARCH … expectations are the driving force leading to the appearance of ARCH/GARCH in the data …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947305

Equilibrium selection under different learning modes in supermodular games

Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.; Tieman, Alexander F. - 1999

We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed by recent evolutionaryliterature to the class of strict supermodular games when two simplebehavior rules coexist in the population, imitation and myopic optimization.We assume that myopic optimizers are able to see how well their payoff...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011302143

A behavioral model for participation games with negative feedback

Dindo, Pietro; Tuinstra, Jan - 2006

We study participation games with negative feedback, i.e. games where players choose either to participate in a certain project or not and where the payoff for participating decreases in the number of participating players. We use the replicator dynamics to model the competition between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349183

Indirect reciprocity, golden opportunities for defection, and inclusive reputation

Albert, Max; Rusch, Hannes - 2013

In evolutionary models of indirect reciprocity, reputation mechanisms can stabilize cooperation even in severe cooperation problems like the prisoner's dilemma. Under certain circumstances, conditionally cooperative strategies, which cooperate iff their partner has a good reputation, cannot be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751156

Stochastic stability in finite extensive-form games of perfect information

Xu, Zibo - 2013

We consider a basic stochastic evolutionary model with rare mutation and a best-reply (or better-reply) selection mechanism. Following Young's papers, we call a state stochastically stable if its long-term relative frequency of occurrence is bounded away from zero as the mutation rate decreases...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009727120

Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay

Feri, Francesco; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. - 2009

This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that determines the level of decay of each link. We address...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009735339

Selfish altruism, fierce cooperation and the emergence of cooperative equilibria from passing and shooting

Askitas, Nikos - 2014

There is continuing debate about what explains cooperation and self-sacrifice in nature and in particular in humans. This paper suggests a new way to think about this famous problem. I argue that, for an evolutionary biologist as well as a quantitative social scientist, the triangle of two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010235846

Coevolution of cooperation, preferences, and cooperative signals in social dilemmas

Müller, Stephan; Wangenheim, Georg von - 2016

We study the coevolution of cooperation, preferences and cooperative signals in an environment where individuals engage in a signaling-extended prisoner's dilemma. We identify a new type of evolutionary equilibrium - a transitional equilibrium - which is constituted and stabilized by the dynamic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526375

Equilibrium selection with coupled populations in hawk-dove games : theory and experiment in continuous time

Benndorf, Volker; Martinez-Martinez, Ismael; Normann, … - 2016

Standard one- and two-population models for evolutionary games are the limit cases of a uniparametric family combining intra- and intergroup interactions. Our setup interpolates between both extremes with a coupling parameter k. For the example of the hawk-dove game, we analyze the replicator...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011487939

Learning to coordinate : co-evolution and correlated equilibrium

Lee-Penagos, Alejandro - 2016

In a coordination game such as the Battle of the Sexes, agents can condition their plays on external signals that can, in theory, lead to a Correlated Equilibrium that can improve the overall payoffs of the agents. Here we explore whether boundedly rational, adaptive agents can learn to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515836

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last