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[Rezension von: Weibull, J. W., Evolutionary game theory]

Schlag, Karl H. - In: Journal of economics 64 (1996) 1, pp. 113-115

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001348194

[Rezension von: Samuelson, L., Evolutionary games and equilibrium selection]

Schlag, Karl H. - In: Journal of economics 68 (1998) 1, pp. 86-88

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001350105

Cheap talk and evolutionary dynamics

Schlag, Karl H. - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000854807

Why imitate, and if so, how? : A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits

Schlag, Karl H. - In: Journal of economic theory 78 (1998) 1, pp. 130-156

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001235743

Loss of commitment? : an evolutionary analysis of Bagwell's example

Oechssler, Joerg - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000971040

Learning and evolution in economic theory

Schlag, Karl H. - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000869997

Loss of commitment? : an evolutionary analysis of Bagwell's example

Oechssler, Joerg; Schlag, Karl H. - 1997

In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657122