Showing 1 - 10 of 14
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003681687
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003871686
Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk-Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003994144
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008796843
Human players in our laboratory experiment converge closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium when matched in a single population version of the standard Hawk-Dove game. When matched across two populations, the same players show clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921525
Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk-Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658435
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009412911
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009760895
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503519
This paper introduces two ideas, emotional state dependent utility components (ESDUCs), and evolutionary perfect Bayesian equilibrium (EPBE). Using a simple extensive form game, we illustrate the efficiency-enhancing role of a powerful ESDUC, the vengeance motive. Incorporating behavioral noise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410673