Similar Search Results

Narrow search

[Rezension von: Weibull, J. W., Evolutionary game theory]

Schlag, Karl H. - In: Journal of economics 64 (1996) 1, pp. 113-115

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001348194

Does noise undermine the first-mover advantage? : An evolutionary analysis of Bagwell's example

Oechssler, Joerg; Schlag, Karl H. - In: International game theory review 2 (2000) 1, pp. 83-96

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001613900

Evolutionarily stable sets

Balkenborg, Dieter; Schlag, Karl H. - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 29 (2000) 4, pp. 571-595

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001606849

Evolutionary insights on the willingness to communicate

Hurkens, Sjaak; Schlag, Karl H. - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 31 (2002) 4, pp. 511-526

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001800740

Loss of commitment? : an evolutionary analysis of Bagwell's example

Oechssler, Joerg; Schlag, Karl H. - 1997

In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657122