This paper empirically analyzes the distribution of unemployment durations in West- Germany before and after the changes during the mid 1980s in the maximum entitlement periods for unemployment benefits for elderly unemployed. The analysis is based on the comprehensive IAB employment subsample...

We compare information on the length of unemployment spells contained in the IAB employment subsample (IABS) and in the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Due to the lack of information on registered unemployment in the IABS, we use two proxies of unemployment in the IABS as introduced by...

m Jahr 1997 wurden die maximalen Anspruchsdauern auf Arbeitslosengeld für ältere Beschäftigte verkürzt. In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden die Auswirkungen dieser Reform auf Übergänge von Beschäftigung in Arbeitslosigkeit und Verweildauern in Arbeitslosigkeit der 54-56jährigen untersucht....

We develop a tractable macroeconomic model with employment risk and labor market search in order evaluate the effects of labor market reform on unemployment, growth, and welfare. The model has a large number of risk-averse households who can invest in risk-free physical capital and risky human...

Young adults entering the labor force typically have little access to unemployment insurance or other formal insurance mechanisms. Instead, they rely on family insurance in the form of parental support to smooth consumption. We study the labor market response of Belgian young adults to decreases...

The paper provides a theoretical rationale for flexicurity policies, which consist of low employment protection, generous unemployment insurance and active labor market programmes. It analyzes in which conditions flexicurity can be optimal. Low employment protection encourages costly education...

Unemployment insurance schemes face a well-known trade-off between providing income support to those out of work and reducing their incentive to look for work. This trade-off between benefits and incentives is central to the public debate about extending benefit periods during the recent...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...

The paper analyses the effects of a 2011 increase in the unemployment benefit replacement rate on the job-finding rate of Slovenian benefit recipients. Using registry data on the universe of Slovenian unemployment benefit recipients, we exploit legislative changes that selectively increased the...

Labor market policies succeed or fail at least in part depending on how well they reflect or account for behavioral responses. Insights from behavioral economics, which allow for realistic deviations from standard economic assumptions about behavior, have consequences for the design and...