Using five empirical methodologies to account for endogeneity issues, this study investigates the effects of board independence and managerial pay on the performance of 169 Saudi listed firms between 2007 and the end of 2014. Studying board independence and managerial pay utilises the main...

Executive equity compensation is granted out of an equity incentive plan that must be approved by shareholders. Equity incentive plans are an important precursor to equity grants because plan terms give boards of directors discretion over the amount and features of equity that can be granted...

Shareholders pay considerable attention to the choice of executive selected as the new CEO whenever a change in leadership takes place. However, without an inside look at the leading candidates to assume the CEO role, it is difficult for shareholders to tell whether the board has made the...

CEO succession at many companies occurs in a black box. Shareholders are not privy to boardroom discussions prior to the announcement of a CEO departure, and press releases announcing the change contain boilerplate language that does not make it clear whether the CEO stepped down voluntary or...

This paper shows outside directors have an increased chance of obtaining new positions (CEO, COB, directorships) during a CEO turnover year in firms that hire a CEO externally. The new positions are determined by outside directors' CEO hiring source choice (internal or external), not their...

We examine whether economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affects a board's chief executive officer (CEO) replacement decision. We find that high EPU reduces the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. Our results support the idea that performance assessment may be more difficult when uncertainty is high....

In their role as initiators of new business projects, CEOs have an advantage over access to and control over project-related information. This exacerbates pre-existing agency frictions and may lead to investment inefficiencies. To counteract this challenge, incentive compensation for corporate...

In this paper, we investigate the consequences of fraud for CEOs and whether these consequences depend on CEO power. We find that CEO power can reduce the likelihood of director turnover as well as CEO turnover after fraud detection. Further, we find that CEO power is negatively related to...

This paper analyzes the determinants of the German corporate governance rating recently developed by Drobetz, Schillhofer, and Zimmermann (2004). We find a non- linear relationship between ownership concentration and the quality of firmlevel corporate governance as measured by the rating. Firms...

We consider a model of CEO selection, dismissal and retention. Firms with larger blockholder ownership monitor more; they get more information about CEO ability, which facilitates the dismissal of low-ability CEOs. These firms are matched with CEOs whose ability is more uncertain. For retention...