We examine how boards decide on CEO compensation depending on how informative stock prices are. In order to mitigate the endogeneity of board decisions, we use extreme mutual fund flow-driven trading pressure as an exogenous shock to stock price informativeness. Consistent with informed boards...

We examine whether boards are sufficiently well-informed to make efficient decisions on CEO compensation. In order to mitigate the endogeneity of board decision on CEO compensation, we use mutual fund flow-driven trading pressure as an exogenous shock to stock price informativeness. Consistent...

To protect fund investors against conflicting interests with fund management companies, U.S. funds have mandatory independent directors. That is not the case for funds in Europe, set-up in accordance with the UCITS Directive. Nevertheless, many UCITS funds have voluntarily appointed independent...

We investigate the governance sensitivity of foreign institutional investors' (FII) ownership in a large emerging market setting of India, characterized by highly concentrated insider ownership. More specifically, we focus on the moderating role of firm size and price to book value (PB) in...

This paper studies how hedge fund activism reshapes board monitoring, CEO incentives and compensation. I find that activists target CEOs who have co-opted the board, have poor performance records and weak equity portfolio incentives, are less subject to relative performance evaluation (RPE) but...

In this article, we investigate the level of diversity of the largest 100 pension funds in the Netherlands. Our results indicate that pension fund boards mainly consist of males close to retirement. We compare pension fund board diversity in the Netherlands with diversity in (inter)national...

Prior literature examines the matching of firm-types with board composition, but very little research focuses on the matching of CEO types with directors' skill sets. We examine whether a gender-diverse board helps to mitigate the negative impacts of overconfident managers, thus improving firm...

We investigate the effects of monitoring by boards of directors and institutional shareholders on merger and acquisition (M&A) performance extremeness using a sample of M&A deals from 1997-2006. Both governance research and legal reforms generally have espoused a ‘raise all boats' view of...

Using more than 30 million quarterly observations on investment funds, firms, and directors, we show that equity-ownership relationships between funds and directors comove when new firms appoint these directors. Funds follow directors from high operating performance and high valuation firms to...