In order to capture and lead the market, a board should be able to understand and quickly react to the changing global market. The market is very complex and highly segmented according to factors such as gender, age and ethnicity. Therefore, having a diverse board is advantageous because the...

This paper examines the relationship between board of director characteristics and performance in family businesses, providing evidence on whether family firms differ from non-family ones and focusing also on the possibility of asymmetrical effects between periods of stability and economic...

Using an agency theory perspective, this paper examines the influence of family control on the board size and board independence of Indonesian listed firms. Further, the study also seeks to investigate whether family control explains the association between board structure and firm value. This...

This study investigates the role of independent board members in insider-controlled firms by examining the effectiveness of independent boards in reducing information asymmetry in family versus non-family firms. We show a negative relation between the proportion of independent directors and...

Boards of directors face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information about executives' behaviour, and only infrequently have information about the success or failure of initiated strategies, reorganizations, mergers...

This paper uses Taiwanese data to examine the impact of firm-level corporate governance mechanisms on firms' average cash holdings. Specifically, it examines how a firm's number of banking relationships and the percentages of managerial ownership and board ownership impact the firm's level of...

This paper shows outside directors have an increased chance of obtaining new positions (CEO, COB, directorships) during a CEO turnover year in firms that hire a CEO externally. The new positions are determined by outside directors' CEO hiring source choice (internal or external), not their...

Extensive research finds that shareholder and CEO preferences affect demand for director services. We find a large body of evidence that independent director reputation incentives influence the supply of director services. These reputation incentives vary across firms and over time,...

We study how interest alignment between CEOs and corporate boards influences investment efficiency and identify a novel force behind the benefit of misaligned preferences. Our model entails a CEO who encounters a project, gathers investment-relevant information, and decides whether or not to...