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governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing competition. We study a model where managers can exert unobservable cost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011734901
We explore the effect of institutional directors on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay (total, fixed, and variable compensation). We delve particularly into the impact of pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional directors, who, respectively, represent institutional investors who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012297875
Executive compensation serves as a metric by which investors measure the quality of a firm's governance. In this paper, I explore how the signaling role of executive compensation impacts the compensation decisions of boards. I show that reputational concerns often cause boards to adopt pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012732156
governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing competition. We study a model where managers can exert unobservable cost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013119061
Executive equity compensation is granted out of an equity incentive plan that must be approved by shareholders. Equity incentive plans are an important precursor to equity grants because plan terms give boards of directors discretion over the amount and features of equity that can be granted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013216623
This paper analyzes how board independence affects a board's monitoring intensity and the CEO pay disparity. We consider a corporate tournament model with a novel feature that the board of directors may lack independence. This has significant implications for a board's monitoring and rewarding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012972652
In this study, we examine whether the levels and structures of top executive compensation vary discernibly with different levels of board independence. We also examine how the newly mandated adoption of the remuneration committee (RC) in Taiwan affects the board independence-executive pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011553128
We analyze how boards' reputational concerns influence executive compensation and the use of hidden pay. Independent boards reduce disclosed pay to signal their independence, but are more likely than manager-friendly boards to use hidden pay or to distort incentive contracts. Stronger...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012828103
We consider a model of CEO selection, dismissal and retention. Firms with larger blockholder ownership monitor more; they get more information about CEO ability, which facilitates the dismissal of low-ability CEOs. These firms are matched with CEOs whose ability is more uncertain. For retention...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012975704
We analyze how the reputational concerns of boards influence executive compensation and the use of hidden pay. Independent boards reduce disclosed pay to signal their independence, but are more likely to use inefficient hidden pay than manager-friendly boards. Stronger reputational pressures...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012976117