We analyze the relation between insider trading and the networks of executive and non-executive directors in UK listed companies. While most existing studies focus on firm-specific private information, we find that non-firm-specific information - such as information on other companies and...

Using a novel dataset containing U.S. companies’ regular board meeting schedules, we find evidence of informed trading by outside directors prior to board meetings. In the days prior to board meetings, when outside directors possess private information, they make purchases that yield higher...

Theories of corporate boards assume that board members of a firm generate private information about the quality and performance of its CEO in the process of monitoring and advising him, and may use this information to decide whether or not to fire him. In this paper, I make use of data on...

Executives trade more profitably and opportunistically over the course of the tenure of independent directors (IDs). IDs' increased connections with and hence allegiance to executives are likely the channel through which ID tenure can affect executive trading. Executive opportunism is mitigated...

Corporate directors earn abnormal returns when they buy their own company's stock as insiders. Directors also outperform when they buy stocks with an interlock connection, where a co-board member is an insider. Directors do not consistently earn abnormal returns when they sell these connected...

Using holdings-based performance measures, we test whether Norway's doubling of its female director network (through board gender-balancing) has increased female insider trading performance. We find that the gender-based insider performance has remained statistically indistinguishable from zero....