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Understanding CEO compensation plans is a continuing challenge for directors and investors. The disclosure of these plans is dictated by SEC rules that rely heavily on the “fair value” of awards at the time they are granted. The problem with these numbers is that they are static and do not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011870307
provide excessive incentives to signal that their firms are well-governed. Moreover, to avoid investor criticism, certain …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012732156
We study the relations between governance mechanisms (internal and external), conference call voluntary disclosures (incidence and length), and CEO compensation using hand-collected data on conference calls, corporate governance, and compensation. We hypothesize and show that institutions push...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974636
In the wake of the backdating scandal, many firms began awarding options at scheduled times each year. Scheduling option grants eliminates backdating, but creates other agency problems. CEOs that know the dates of upcoming scheduled option grants have an incentive to temporarily depress stock...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006948
We study the relations between governance mechanisms (internal and external), conference call voluntary disclosures (incidence and length), and CEO compensation using hand-collected data on conference calls, corporate governance, and compensation. We hypothesize and show that institutions push...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013030764
We investigate an emerging pay-performance activism under a natural setting of performance-focused shareholder proposals rule (PSPs) (Rule 14a-8) established by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for top management compensation. We find that: (1) PSP sponsors successfully identify...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066953
. However, recent evidence suggests that high-powered incentives also provide managers with incentives to manipulate the firm … firm hierarchy — division managers and Chief Financial Officers — are likely to have similar incentives, and perhaps even …, previous research focuses on equity incentives and largely ignores other elements of incentive pay. We contribute to this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013112655
I build a model of optimal managerial compensation where managers each have a privately observed propensity to manipulate short-term stock prices. It is shown that this informational asymmetry reverses some of the conventional wisdom about the relationship between reliance on short-term pay and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011287603
maintain the same level of incentives, which in turn increases the equilibrium earnings manipulation. Trade-offs between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905339
price to push for higher-powered and more short-term focused equity incentives. Such managers also work harder, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938535