This paper analyses the determinants of disclosure in compensation reports. Using a hand-collected dataset of 429 observations we assess which compensation, governance and ownership variables influence the quality of disclosure in compensation reports from 2006 to 2014 in a German setting....

This paper analyses the determinants of disclosure in compensation reports. Using a hand-collected dataset of 429 observations we assess which compensation, governance and ownership variables influence the quality of disclosure in compensation reports from 2006 to 2014 in a German setting....

This paper investigates whether and how social-psychological mechanisms, namely reciprocity, demographic similarity, and similar experiences, affect CEO compensation packages with respect to the levels of total, fixed, and short- and mid-term compensation and the variable proportion of the...

We study relative performance evaluation in executive compensation when executives have private information about their ability. We assume that the joint distribution of an individual firm’s profit and market movements depends on the ability of the executive that runs the firm. In the...

This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock-based incentives elicit not only productive effort, but also costly...

This paper conducts an analysis of the relationship between CEO compensation and managerial performance on a large panel of US public firms, by taking into account the different components of CEO compensation. We estimate a stochastic frontier model in which managerial performance is related to...

Although many companies in the UK adopted an incentive plan for their directors in response to the Cadbury recommendation, few studies have examined the effect of these incentive programmes on firm performance. We investigate whether companies with these incentive plans achieve better...

Executive compensation serves as a metric by which investors measure the quality of a firm's governance. In this paper, I explore how the signaling role of executive compensation impacts the compensation decisions of boards. I show that reputational concerns often cause boards to adopt pay...

Are firms' financial disclosure decisions affected by executive compensation at other firms? We find that a CEO's pay gap relative to the highest CEO pay among industry peers, defined as industry tournament incentives, can lead to distortions in corporate financial disclosures. Our analyses show...

I study the effect of passive institutional ownership on CEO compensation duration by exploiting exogenous variation in passive ownership associated with Russell Index reconstitution. A one-standard-deviation increase in passive ownership leads to a 0.46-standard-deviation increase in...