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CEO inside debt and hedging decisions : lessons from the US banking industry
Belkhir, Mohamed; Boubaker, Sabri - In: Journal of international financial markets, … 24 (2013), pp. 223-246
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009726373
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Optimal Contracts or Managerial Power? Evidence on the Impact of CEO Compensation on Bank Risk in Europe
Uhde, André - 2011
Using unique hand-collected data on CEO compensation packages retrieved from the largest 59 European banks from 16 Western European countries for the period from 2000 to 2008 this paper provides empirical evidence that both variable cash-based and variable equity-based compensation are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124463
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CEO Pay Gap and Bank Risk-taking
DeYoung, Robert - 2019
The large compensation received by bank executives is among the many factors blamed for the risk-taking that led to the 2008-2009 financial crisis. We test whether and how pay disparities between CEO and non-CEO executives—the so-called CEO pay gap—influenced risk taking at publicly traded...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012858941
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Executive Compensation Restrictions : Do they Restrict Firms’ Willingness to Participate in TARP?
Cadman, Brian D. - 2012
We examine the implications of regulatory intervention in pay-setting, by studying whether executive compensation restrictions associated with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) influence banks' participation in the program. We find that banks more likely to be impacted by the restrictions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116107
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CEO Compensation and Risk-Taking at Financial Firms : Evidence from U.S. Federal Loan Assistance
Gande, Amar - 2017
We examine whether risk-taking among the largest financial firms in the U.S. is related to CEO equity incentives before the 2008 financial crisis. Using data on U.S. Federal Reserve emergency loans provided to these firms, we find that the amount of emergency loans and total days the loans are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012975959
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Compensation Vega, Deregulation and Risk-Taking : Lessons from the U.S. Banking Industry
Belkhir, Mohamed - 2010
This study examines three issues related to the sensitivity of bank CEO compensation to risk, or vega: (1) its relevance compared with CEO compensation vega in industrial firms; (2) its determinants; and (3) its effect on bank risk-taking. Using a sample of 156 U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013147144
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Trading away incentives
Colonnello, Stefano; Curatola, Giuliano Antonio; Xia, Shuo - 2022 - This draft: October 19, 2022
Equity pay has been the primary component of managerial compensation packages at US public firms since the early 1990s. Using a comprehensive sample of top executives from 1992-2020, we estimate to what extent they trade firm equity held in their portfolios to neutralize increments in ownership...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013411812
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Equity incentives, disclosure quality, and stock liquidity risk
Wruck, Karen H.; Wu, Yi Lin - 2017
We provide evidence that CEO equity incentives, especially stock options, influence stock liquidity risk via information disclosure quality. We document a negative association between CEO options and the quality of future managerial disclosure policy. Contributing to the literature on CEO...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011963233
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Industry Tournament Incentives and Corporate Hedging Policies
Lonare, Gunratan - 2020
corporate hedging policies. We exploit the textual analysis of 10-Ks to generate corporate hedging proxies. We find that the … of corporate hedging on the adverse effects of risk-inducing ITIs on the cost of debt and stock price crash risk, which … could be the possible reasons for the relation. Also, the relation between ITIs and corporate hedging is less pronounced for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849052
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Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value
Armstrong, Christopher S.; Vashishtha, Rahul - In: Journal of Financial Economics 104 (2012) 1, pp. 70-88
The sensitivity of stock options' payoff to return volatility, or vega, provides risk-averse CEOs with an incentive to increase their firms' risk more by increasing systematic rather than idiosyncratic risk. This effect manifests because any increase in the firm's systematic risk can be hedged...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010571660