The literature on shareholder voting has mostly focused on the influence of proxy advisors on shareholder votes. We exploit a unique empirical setting enabling us to provide a direct estimate of management's influence. Analyzing shareholder votes on the frequency of future say on pay votes, we...

We investigate the economic role of proxy advisors (PA) in the context of mandatory “say on pay” votes, a novel and complex item requiring significant firm-specific analysis. PA are more likely to issue an Against recommendation at firms with poor performance and higher levels of CEO pay and...

We investigate the economic role of proxy advisors (PAs) in the context of mandatory "say on pay" votes, a novel and complex item requiring significant firm-specific analysis. PAs are more likely to issue an Against recommendation at firms with poor performance and higher levels of CEO pay and...

We examine the consequences of the highly anticipated and controversial Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which mandates companies to disclose the CEO-to-median employee pay ratio starting from 2018. We address endogeneity concerns by using a regression discontinuity design around the public...

We investigate how luck, namely, changes in a firm’s performance beyond the CEO’s control, affects strategic risk-taking. Fusing upper echelons theory with insights from psychology and behavioral strategy research, we hypothesize that there is a positive association between luck and...

We develop three complementary tests to examine how adverse selection affects the design of executive compensation contracts: First, we show that externally hired CEOs receive higher total pay and have fewer equity incentives relative to internally promoted CEOs, consistent with their ability to...