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Is Executive Compensation a Substitute Governance Mechanism to Debt Financing and Leasing?
Minhat, Marizah - 2017
between CEO equity incentives and firm leverage. We also found that CEO equity incentives and leases are negatively related …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012976429
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Credit Stimulus, Executive Compensation, and Firm Leverage
Dahiya, Sandeep - 2020
We show that executive ownership is a significant driver of the demand for credit following credit expansion policies. Our focus on credit demand is in contrast to most studies that have focused on credit supply factors such as bank-capital. Our identification exploits the large and unexpected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854426
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Powerful CEOs and Capital Structure Decisions : Evidence from the CEO Pay Slice (CPS)
Chintrakarn, Pandej - 2014
Motivated by agency theory, we explore how powerful CEOs view leverage. Due to the agency conflict, CEOs may adopt sub …-optimal leverage levels that promote their own private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Using Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer …'s (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS) to gauge CEO power, we find that powerful CEOs view leverage negatively and avoid high debt …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061799
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CEO Tournament Incentives and Corporate Debt Contracting
Ghosh, Chinmoy; Huang, Di; Nguyen, Nam; Phan, Hieu V. - 2022
This study examines the relation between CEO tournament incentives, proxied by the difference between CEO pay and the median pay of the senior executives of a given firm, and corporate debt contracting. We find negative relations between CEO pay gap and the cost of debt and default risk, and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014235416
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CEO Pay Duration and Corporate Debt Maturity Structure
Fu, Xudong - 2019
While recent studies show that long vesting periods in managerial compensation increase corporate investments, it may reshape the shareholder-debtholder conflict as shareholders have to split the gains with creditors. We find that firms with longer CEO pay durations use more short-maturity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012868405
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The Additional Costs of CEO Compensation : The Effect of Relative Wealth Concerns of Employees
Dittmann, Ingolf - 2020
Do employees who compare themselves to the CEO matter for executive compensation? We hypothesize that employees have relative wealth concerns and compare their wage to the CEO's pay. Using German establishment-level wage data, we indeed show that employee wages are increasing in CEO...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852515
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The Effect of CEO Option Compensation on the Capital Structure : A Natural Experiment
Tosun, Onur Kemal - 2019
leverage changes as a result of CEO option compensation changes. The evidence provides strong support for debt agency theory …. The results indicate firms decrease leverage when CEOs are paid with more options, and when CEO options become a higher …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904713
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Executive Equity Risk-Taking Incentives and Firm's Choice of Debt Structure
Chen, Yangyang - 2020
We examine how executive equity risk-taking incentives affect firms' choice of debt structure. Using a longitudinal sample of U.S. firms, we document that when executive compensation is more sensitive to stock volatility (i.e., has higher vega), firms reduce their reliance on bank debt...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853594
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Managerial Compensation Incentives and Corporate Debt Maturity : Evidence from FAS 123R
Hong, Jieying - 2018
This paper studies the effect of risk-taking incentives provided in managerial compensation on corporate debt maturity choices. The Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R is used as a quasi-natural experiment to establish causality. FAS 123R requires firms to expense stock options at fair...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012931946
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Banker-Directors and CEO Inside Debt
Korczak, Piotr - 2018
Using employment history of over 17,000 directors of non-financial firms, we find that boards with directors who have executive experience in a commercial bank compensate CEOs with higher inside debt. This result is consistent with arguments that professional experience shapes decision-making....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012930259