Consider a firm owned by shareholders with heterogeneous beliefs and run by a manager. Shareholders can trade contingent claims in a complete asset market. The manager is given a contract so that at equilibrium she chooses the plan preferred by shareholders. We show that the contract should...

We provide a discipline for belief formation through an evolutionary process which favors beliefs leading to higher utility levels at the Walrasian equilibrium. We show that such an evolutionary process converges to the Nash equilibrium in a game of strategic beliefs choices. The asymptotic...

We analyze a model with two types of agents: standard agents and gurus, i.e. agents who have the ability to influence the other investors. Gurus announce their beliefs and act accordingly. Gurus are strategic: they take into account the impact of their announced beliefs on the other agents,...

We provide a discipline for beliefs formation through a model of subjective beliefs, in which agents hold incorrect but strategic beliefs. More precisely, we consider beliefs as a strategic variable that agents can manipulate to maximize their utility from trade. Our framework is therefore an...

We develop a general equilibrium model of interest rates based on a continuous-time production economy populated by heterogeneous shareholders with logarithmic preferences. It allows us to study the impact of belief heterogeneity on bonds, the risk-free rate, and the yield curve. In particular,...