Bids in private value first price auctions consistently deviate from risk neutral symmetric equilibrium bids. It is difficult to explain this deviation with risk aversion. We propose and test two other explanations: (1) Bidders do not form correct expectations. (2) Bidders do not play a best...

Bubbles are omnipresent in lab experiments with asset markets. But these experiments were (mostly) conducted in environments with only human traders. Today markets are substantially determined by algorithmic traders. Here we use a laboratory experiment to measure human trading behaviour changes...

Deviations from equilibrium bids in auctions can be related to inconsistent expectations with correct best replies (see Eyster and Rabin, 2005; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007) or correct expectations but small (perhaps quantal-response) mistakes in best replies (see Goeree et al., 2002). To distinguish...

In this paper we study equilibrium- and experimental bidding behaviour in first-price and second price auctions with outside options. We find that bidders do respond to outside options and to variations of common knowledge about competitors' outside options. However, overbidding in first-price...

Deviations from equilibrium bids in auctions can be related to inconsistent expectations with correct best replies (see Eyster and Rabin, 2005; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007) or correct expectations but small (perhaps quantal-response) mistakes in best replies (see Goeree et al., 2002). To distinguish...