We present the first calibration of quantum decision theory (QDT) to an empirical data set. The data comprise 91 choices between two lotteries (two "prospects") presented in 91 random pairs made by 142 subjects offered at two separated times. First, we quantitatively account for the fraction of...

This paper discusses models of choice under imprecise objective probabilistic information featuring beliefs about beliefs -- second order beliefs. A new model, called Second Order Dual Expected Utility (SODEU) featuring non-additive second order beliefs is introduced, axiomatized and...

The psychological basis for rank-dependent probability weighting, and for an inverse-S probability weighting function (PWF) in particular, has often been questioned. I examine the existence and shape of the PWF in a model allowing for optimism/pessimism over probability distributions and for...

Two of the most well known regularities observed in preferences under risk and uncertainty are ambiguity aversion and the Allais paradox. We study the behav- ior of an agent who can display both tendencies simultaneously. We introduce a novel notion of preference for hedging that applies to both...

Stochastic independence has a complex status in probability theory. It is not part of the definition of a probability measure, but it is nonetheless an essential property for the mathematical development of this theory. Bayesian decision theorists such as Savage can be criticized for being...

Humans are notoriously bad at understanding probabilities, exhibiting a host of biases and distortions that are context dependent. This has serious consequences on how we assess risks and make decisions. Several theories have been developed to replace the normative rational expectation theory at...

This chapter provides a critical review of the theories of decision making under risk and under uncertainty and the notion of choice-based subjective probabilities. It includes formal statements and discussions of the various models, including their analytical frameworks, the corresponding...

Anscombe and Aumann (1963) offer a definition of subjective probability in terms of comparisons with objective probabilities. That definition - which has provided the basis for much of the succeeding work on subjective probability - presumes that the subjective probability of an event is...

Whereas many others have scrutinized the Allais paradox from a theoretical angle, we study the paradox from an historical perspective and link our findings to a suggestion as to how decision theory could make use of it today. We emphasize that Allais proposed the paradox as a normative argument,...