An expected utility based cost-benefit analysis is in general fragile to its distributional assumptions. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions on the utility function of the expected utility model to avoid this. The conditions ensure that expected (marginal) utility remains finite also...

Most theories of risky choice postulate that a decision maker maximizes the expectation of a Bernoulli (or utility or similar) function. We tour 60 years of empirical search and conclude that no such functions have yet been found that are useful for out-of-sample prediction. Nor do we find...

This paper re-examines the rank-dependent expected utility theory. Firstly, we follow Quiggin's assumption (Quiggin 1982) to deduce the rank-dependent expected utility formula over lotteries and hence extend it to the case of general random variables. Secondly, we utilize the distortion function...

This paper elaborates an axiomatic treatment of the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model that dispenses with the assumption of an exogenous state space. Within a state-free description of uncertainty and alternatives, axioms for preferences are formulated and shown to characterize the...

We consider decision-makers facing a risky wealth prospect. The probability distribution depends on pecuniary effort, e.g., the amount invested in a venture or prevention expenditures to protect against accidental losses. We provide necessary local conditions and sufficient global conditions for...

This paper surveys asset allocation methods that extend the traditional approach. An important feature of the traditional approach is that measures the risk and return tradeoff in terms of mean and variance of final wealth. However, there are also other important features that are not always...

Many choice-theoretic and game-theoretic applications in Economics invoke some form of supermodularity or increasing differences for objective functions defined on lattices. These notes provide axiomatic foundations for these properties on expected-utility representations of preferences over...

In the context of extreme climate change, we ask how to conduct expected utility analysis in the presence of catastrophic risks. Economists typically model decision making under risk and uncertainty by expected util- ity with constant relative risk aversion (power utility); statisticians typi-...

This paper takes choice theory to risk or uncertainty. Well-known decision models are axiomatized under the premise that agents can randomize. Under a reversal of order assumption, this convexifies choice sets, and even after imposing the weak axiom of revealed preference and nonemptiness of...

We study how learning shapes behavior towards risk when individuals are not assumed to know, or to have beliefs about, probability distributions. In any period, the behavior change induced by learning is assumed to depend on the action chosen and the payoff obtained. We characterize learning...