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Selfishness as a potential cause of crime : a prison experiment
Chmura, Thorsten; Engel, Christoph; Englerth, Markus - 2013
the recipient is a charity. Prisoners give more, not less. -- Inequity aversion ; crime ; dictator game ; selfishness …For a rational choice theorist, the absence of crime is more difficult to explain than its presence. Arguably, the … explain how imperfect criminal sanctions deter crime. The critical component of the theory is aversion against outperforming …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009723560
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Selfishness as a Potential Cause of Crime - A Prison Experiment
Chmura, Thorsten - 2013
For a rational choice theorist, the absence of crime is more difficult to explain than its presence. Arguably, the … explain how imperfect criminal sanctions deter crime. The critical component of the theory is aversion against outperforming … the recipient is a charity. Prisoners give more, not less …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013084563
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Experimental criminal law : a survey of contributions from law, economics and criminology
Engel, Christoph - 2016
In three distinct disciplines, crime and punishment are studied experimentally: in empirical legal studies, in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011455955
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The solidarity motive
Engel, Christoph - 2016
For decades, experimental economics has been very interested in behavior that could be characterized as practicing solidarity (although the term is rarely used). Solidarity is a key concept in Catholic Social Teaching. This paper builds a bridge between these two endeavors that, thus far, had...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011553331
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At the mercy of a prisoner three dictator experiments
Chmura, Thorsten; Engel, Christoph; Englerth, Markus - In: Applied economics letters 24 (2017) 10/12, pp. 774-778
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011714205
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Greedy and selfish? : differences in fairness preferences of prospective lawyers and managers
Mertins, Vanessa; Warning, Susanne - In: Zeitschrift für Personalforschung : ZfP 28 (2014) 4, pp. 410-431
The question of whether lawyers and managers behave selfishly or fairly has inspired discussion for a long time. Empirical evidence, however, is sparse. Using data from an experiment with 359 law and business administration students, we investigate this question empirically and provide first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011299882
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Large effects of small cues : priming selfish economic decisions
Snir, Avichai; Levy, Dudi; Wang, Dian; Chen, Haipeng; … - 2024 - Revised: April 21, 2024
Many experimental studies report that economics students tend to act more selfishly than students of other disciplines, a finding that received widespread public and professional attention. Two main explanations that the existing literature offers for the differences found in the behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014531967
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Reputation transmission without benefit to the reporter : a behavioral underpinning of markets in experimental focus
Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis G. - 2015 - This version: September 8, 2015
Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism in economic and social interactions. But it is often unclear what would motivate an agent to report another’s behavior when the pool of potential partners is large and it is easy enough for an aggrieved player to move on. We argue that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333021
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Are teams less inequality averse than individuals?
He, Haoran; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2014
-making because they anticipate the selfishness of other members. Members with median social preferences drive team decisions. Finally …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010359304
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Does payoff equity facilitate coordination? : a test of Schelling's conjecture
López-Pérez, Raúl; Pintér, Ágnes; Kiss, Hubert J. - 2013
Starting from Schelling (1960), several game theorists have conjectured that payoff equity might facilitate coordination in normal-form games with multiple equilibria - the more equitable equilibrium might be selected either because fairness makes it focal or because many individuals dislike...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224794