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Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship. In this paper, we study how reductions in clarity about the financial consequences of actions, induced by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011521953
Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship. In this paper, we study how reductions in clarity about the financial consequences of actions, induced by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526817
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334241
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001508076
We study how different payment modes inuence the effectiveness of gift exchange as a contract enforcement device. In particular, we analyze how horizontal fairness concerns affect performance and efficiency in an environment characterized by contractual incompleteness. In our experiment, one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003854042
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008902576
We study how different payment modes influence the effectiveness of gift exchange as a contract enforcement device. In particular, we analyze how horizontal fairness concerns affect performance and efficiency in an environment characterized by contractual incompleteness. In our experiment, one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003863658
This paper studies how pay transparency affects organizations that reward employees based on their efforts (i.e., using "subjective performance evaluation"). First, we show that transparency triggers social comparisons that require the organization to pay its employees an "envy premium". This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012418628
This paper studies how pay transparency affects organizations that reward employees based on their efforts (i.e., using "subjective performance evaluation"). First, we show that transparency triggers social comparisons that require the organization to pay its employees an "envy premium". This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012416248
We develop a model of strategic contractual incompleteness that identifies conditions under which principals might omit even costlessly verifiable terms. We then use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of the model. While it is well known that verifiability imperfections can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457849