In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payoffis exogenously given whereas that of the responder is endogenouslydetermined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. Earlier resultsfor two-person generosity games show that participants seem to caremore for eciency than for equity....

We run a computerised experiment of network formation where allconnections are bene…cial and only direct links are costly. Players simul-taneously submit link proposals; a connection is made only when bothplayers involved agree. We use both simulated and experimentally gen-erated data to test...

In an aging society, it becomes more and more important to understand how aging affects decision making. Older adults have to face many situations that require consequential financial decisions. In the present study, we examined the effects of aging on decisions in two domains of uncertainty:...

Sick-pay is a common provision in labor contracts. It insures workersagainst a sudden loss of income due to unexpected absences andhelps them smooth consumption. Therefore, many governments findsick-pay socially desirable and choose to mandate its provision. Butsick-pay is not without its...

It is difficult to disagree with Vernon Smith's (2010) assessment of thestate of the art in experimental economics. It is informed by the experienceof someone who was there, right at the beginning of experimental economics.Some of the problems he discusses, like the frequent failure of backward...

Goeree & Holt (2001) observe that, for some parameter values, Nash equilibrium providesgood predictions for actual behaviour in experiments. For other payoff parameters, however,actual behaviour deviates consistently from that predicted by Nash equilibria. They attributethe robust deviations...

Assuming investors are loss averse, repeated risky investments are less attractive inmyopic evaluation. A theoretical foundation for this effect is given by the behavioralconcept of myopic loss aversion (MLA). The consequences of MLA have been confirmedin several between-subject experimental...

We analyze a two-stage game between two heterogeneous players.At stage one, common risk is chosen by one of the players. At stagetwo, both players observe the given level of risk and simultaneouslyinvest in a winner-take-all competition. The game is solved theoreticallyand then tested by using...

To investigate the external validity of Ultimatum and Dictator game behavior we conduct experiments in field settings with naturally occurring variation in "social framing." Our participants are students at Middlebury College, non-traditional students at Kansas City Kansas Community College...