How do actual prisoners solve their proverbial dilemma? In a lab experiment, conducted in a German prison for male juvenile offenders, we find that prisoners are no less cooperative than students in a symmetric two-person prisoner's dilemma. Using data from post-experimental tests, we explain...

Payment for ecosystem service (PES) programs incentivize farmers to implement agricultural best management practices (BMPs) with the goal of reducing nutrient and sediment runoff and improving water quality. These programs are widespread at both the federal and state level. Because some farmers...

We examine the private provision of a public good whose level is determined by the least contribution of individual group members. Nash equilibrium can be efficient when the game is one of full information. This paper introduces private information about the costs of effort and characterizes...

Existing sociological research on support for anti-poverty programs largely focuses on broad categories of welfare or assistance to the poor rather than particular types of transfers. Using an experimental survey design and mixed methods research, we examine whether support for anti-poverty...

In a laboratory experiment with salient rewards, subjects were endowed with money and waiting time. Preferences for waiting time were elicited both as a private good by means of a series of second price auctions, i.e., in a non-induced values framework, and as a public good in the scope of a...

Discrete choice experiments are an important method to derive willingness-to-pay estimates for non-market goods. Several studies have shown that willingness-to-pay estimates derived from discrete choice experiments can be sensitive to the order of the presented choice tasks or the size of the...

We estimate the effect of an increase in time cost on the return behavior of blood donors. Using data from the Australia Red Cross Blood Service, we ask what happens when pro-social behavior becomes more costly. Exploiting a natural variation in which donor wait times are random, we use the...

Elements of regulation inherent in most social health insurance systems are a uniform package of benefits and uniform cost sharing. Both elements risk to burden the population with a welfare loss if preferences differ. This suggests introducing more contracted choice; however, it is widely...

Health insurance is potentially subject to risk selection, i.e. adverse selection on the part of consumers and cream skimming on the part of insurers. Adverse selection models predict that competitive health insurers can eschew high-risk individuals by offering contracts with low deductibles or...

We estimate the effect of an increase in time cost on the return behavior of blood donors. Using data from the Australia Red Cross Blood Service, we ask what happens when pro-social behavior becomes more costly. Exploiting a natural variation in which donor wait times are random, we use the...