auction with an additional buyer is conducted. The theoretical model predicts that with risk neutral agents all sales take … place in the auction rendering the negotiation prior to the auction obsolete. An experimental test of the model provides …

In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature …

trade. Those auctions come in a variety of different formats, such as the Buy-It-Now auction format on eBay, that allows … sellers to post prices at which buyers can purchase a good prior to the auction. Even though, buyer behavior is well studied … auction market (the eBay platform and eBay traders) with the techniques of lab experiments. We find a striking link between …

heterogeneity in the dispersion of private value components. I use the asymmetric ascending auction model of Hong and Shum (2003) to …

An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected … externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another … example are cross-shareholdings between companies that compete in an auction. We derive an auction that coincides with the SPA …

opportunity to accept a posted price offer from the seller before the start of the auction. Bringing the field into the lab, we …

An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected … externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another … example are cross-shareholdings between companies that compete in an auction. We derive an auction that coincides with the SPA …

-prices, bidders are reluctant to bid above the option price (even though the option is no longer available once an auction has started …

as an explanation. If spite extends to the seller, then the absence of human sellers who receive the auction revenue may …

externality-robust implementation. In particular, we derive the externality-robust counterpart of the second-price auction. Our … experiments replicate the earlier finding of overbidding in the second-price auction, but we find that average bids equal value in … the externality-robust auction. Our data also reveal that both auctions produce the same level of efficiency, suggesting …