This paper proposes the following mechanism whereby polarization of beliefs could eliminate political gridlock instead of intensifying disagreement: the expectation of political payoffs from being proven correct by a policy failure could drive decision makers who do not believe in the new policy...

We study the experimentation dynamics of a decision maker (DM) in a two-armed bandit setup (Bolton and Harris [1999]), where the agent holds ambiguous beliefs regarding the distribution of the return process of one arm and is certain about the other one. The DM entertains Multiplier preferences...

We assume that an impatient decision maker (DM) runs variable-size experiments at an increasing, strictly convex cost before choosing an irreversible action. We introduce and solve a tractable continuous time version of this problem - a control of variance of a diffusion with uncertain mean....

We assume that an impatient decision maker (DM) runs variable-size experiments at an increasing, strictly convex cost before choosing an irreversible action. We introduce and solve a tractable continuous time version of this problem --- a control of variance of a diffusion with uncertain mean....

This paper experimentally studies an essential institutional feature of matching markets: Randomization of allocation priorities. I compare single and multiple randomization in the student assignment problem with ties. The Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm is employed after...

This paper proposes a decision-theoretic framework for experiment design. We model experimenters as ambiguity-averse decision-makers, who make trade-offs between subjective expected performance and robustness. This framework accounts for experimenters' preference for randomization, and clarifies...

Evidence suggests that participants in direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanisms (DA) play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria in DA. We find...

Evidence suggests that participants in direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanisms (DSPDA) play dominated strategies. To explain the observed data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria in...

Extensive evidence suggests that participants in the direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism (DSPDA) play dominated strategies. In particular, students with low priority tend to misrepresent their preferences for popular schools. To explain the observed data, we introduce...

Evidence suggests that participants in direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanisms (DA) play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria in DA. We find...