People typically update their beliefs about their own abilities too little in response to feed-back, a phenomenon known as "conservatism", and some studies suggest that they overweight good relative to bad signals ("asymmetry"). We measure individual conservatism and asymmetry in three tasks...

This study experimentally investigates two possible reasons for cooperative investment decisions in common pool resource games with two players. One reason is strategic behavior: subjects, who are allowed to interact with their partners repeatedly, attempt to build a long-term relationship and...

In order to decrease social distance and increase trust on their platforms, many online marketplaces allow traders to be represented by profile pictures or avatars. In a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether the presence of seller avatars affects trading behavior in a market. We contrast...

We use the investment game introduced by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) to explore gender differences in trust and reciprocity. In doing so we replicate and extend the results first reported by Croson and Buchan (1999). We find that men exhibit greater trust than women do while women show much...

We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...

We test the Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), a stability measure and refinement for cheap talk equilibria introduced in De Groot Ruiz, Offerman & Onderstal (2011b). ACDC has been shown to be predictive under general conditions and to organize data well in previous experiments meant...

In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...

Coordination games have multiple equilibria under complete information. However, recent theoretical advances show that if players are uncertain but can acquire information about a payoff-relevant state of the world, the number of equilibria depends on whether they can implement strategies...

In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...